Designating Terrorist Organizations: Due Process Overdue by Wyatt, Micah
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 2 Article 4
January 2009
Designating Terrorist Organizations: Due Process
Overdue
Micah Wyatt
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Construction Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation





DUE PROCESS OVERDUE 
The requirement of 'due process' is not a fair-weather or timid 
assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of 
trouble. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter l 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Frankfurter wrote these powerful words in 1951, in the early 
part of the Cold War? This was a time when the United States of 
America struggled to keep a nation secure while still preserving the 
principles upon which it stood. This was a time of war, a time of fear, 
and a time of immense distrust in a dangerous enemy engaged in covert 
activities. It was thought by some that certain constitutional protections 
must be sacrificed in order to maintain national security. Yet, in Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, a case challenging the 
authority of the Attorney General of the United States to designate 
organizations as communist, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
organizations' constitutional rights.3 This quotation appeared in Justice 
Frankfurter's concurrence in which he wrote a commanding defense of 
I Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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procedural due process rights.4 In 1951, the enemy was communism. 
Today, it is terrorism. Yet, the temptation to forgo constitutional 
protections in favor of laws that purport to offer greater security remains 
the same. 
With striking similarity to the communist designations at issue in 
McGrath, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") in response to terrorist attacks. 5 
Section 302 of the AEDPA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189 ("§ 1189"), 
gives the Secretary of State the authority to designate an organization as 
a Foreign Terrorist Organization ("FTO"), thereby freezing its assets and 
criminalizing its supporters.6 
Without a doubt § 1189 is a powerful tool. 7 It fights terrorism by 
cutting off its source-support, financial or otherwise.8 The so-called 
"material support" provisions of the AEDPA, primarily found in 18 
U.S.c. § 2339B, provide the Justice Department with a powerful tool to 
intercept and prevent terrorist acts from occurring at all, rather than 
merely prosecuting the actors after the acts of terrorism have already 
been carried out.9 Since its passage, § 1189, together with the material 
support provisions of the AEDP A, has proven to be one of the most 
effective means of fighting terrorism. 10 Yet § 1189 is wholly lacking in 
basic procedural due process protections. It does not provide notice of 
the designation, an opportunity for the organization to rebut the factual 
support for the designation, or the opportunity to be heard before an 
unbiased adjudicator. II Two of these three basic requirements, notice 
and a hearing, have been judicially mandated. I2 However, neither § 1189 
nor any subsequent judicial decision has required the most important 
element of basic procedural due process-an unbiased adjudicator. I3 
4 Jd. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
S Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (\996); Presidential Statement, 1996 WL 203049, at 
*1 (Apr. 26, 1996). 
6 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2009); 18 U.S.C. § 23398 (2009). 
7 See generally A Review of the Material Support to Terrorism Prohibition Jmprovements 
Act Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland 
Security, 104th Congo (Apr. 20, 2005) (joint statement of Daniel Meron, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Civil Division and 8arry Sabin, Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Department of 




II See generally 8 U .S.C. § 1189 (2009). 
12 See Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran V. Dep't of State (NCRI), 251 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. 
Cir 2001). 
13 See 8 U.S.C. §1189 (2009); People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.s. Dep't of State 
(PMOJ). 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1999); NCRI, 251 F.3d at 205; People's Mojahedin Org. oflran 
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An unbiased adjudicator is important not simply to remedy the 
constitutional deficiencies as applied to the organizations themselves, but 
also as applied to the people severely punished for supporting them. It is 
hard to imagine a law that, with a single act of the Executive, has ripple 
effects on more lives. After the Secretary of State designates an FTO, all 
the organization's assets within the United States are frozen. 14 It 
becomes a crime, punishable by fifteen years in prison, to give "material 
support" to the organization. 15 Any person who gives support to an FTO 
is ineligible for entry into the United States,16 and aliens currently 
residing within the United States are deportable. 17 Material support is 
defined broadly and can include providing food and shelter to a member 
of the organization. 18 The AEDPA does not require that a person intend 
to support the illegal purpose of the FTO.19 Even where the organization 
undertakes legitimate activities and the support was intended to further 
only those legitimate activities, the support is illega1.2o The invalidity of 
the FTO designation is no defense to these charges.21 The prosecutor 
must only show that the organization was a designated FTO, not that that 
designation was accurate?2 
After a deadly, unconscionable attack on our Nation, the temptation 
to forgo constitutional protections in favor of laws that purport to offer 
greater security is certainly high. Still, laws that fight terrorism but lack 
basic constitutional protections are no more valid after catastrophic acts 
of war than they are in times of peace. For this reason, § 1189 must be 
amended to include the basic requirements of procedural due process. 
v. u.s. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. 
Dep't of State, 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Chai v. Dep't of State, 466 F.3d 125, 129 (D.C. Cir. 
2006); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 398 (9th Cir. 2003), 
vacated, Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); U.S. v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1157-
58 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Chai v. Dep't of 
State, 466 F.3d 125, 127 (2006); U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002); U.S. v. 
Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2006); U.S. v. AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300, 
1304-05 (M.D. Fla. 2004); U.S. v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1071-72 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
14 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2009). 
15 18 U.S.C. § 23398 (2009). 
16 8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(3)(8)(i)(I) (2009). 
17 Id. at § I 227(a)(4)(8). 
18 Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). 
19 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1130-33 (9th Cir. 2007). 
20 Id. 
21 See 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(8) (2009). 
228 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(8) (2009); see also U.S. v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) 
("Under § 23398, if defendants provide material support for an organization that has been 
designated a terrorist organization under § 1189, they commit the crime, and it does not matter 
whether the designation is correct or not. "). 
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This Comment argues that § 1189 is unconstitutional because it 
deprives accused terrorist organizations due process under the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Section I will provide an 
explanation of § 1189 and § 2339B and their effect on both an 
organization and its supporters. Section II will provide a brief overview 
of the Due Process Clause in the context of administrative proceedings. 
Section III will show how § 1189 deprives organizations due process 
under the Fifth Amendment because the statute does not include the most 
fundamental requirements of procedural due process. Section III(A) will 
address the initial question of whether organizations are entitled to due 
process protection. Section III(B) will compare the requirements of the 
Due Process Clause with the statute as it is written. Section III(C) will 
look at the additional protections the courts have read into the statute. 
Section III(D) will show why, even with these additional protections, the 
statute is missing a vital component of procedural due process-an 
unbiased adjudicator. Finally, section IV will show that under the United 
States Supreme Court's current framework for analyzing the 
requirements of procedural due process, § 1189 is unconstitutional and 
should be amended to include an unbiased and neutral decisionmaker to 
adjudicate an accused organization's opposition. 
I. THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 
After the Oklahoma City bombing,23 Congress passed and President 
William Jefferson Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA,').24 Title three of AEDPA, entitled 
"International Terrorism Prohibitions," was designed to provide 
"valuable tools for stopping and punishing terrorists,,25 and to combat the 
circumstance, as found by Congress, that "foreign terrorist organizations, 
acting through affiliated groups or individuals, raise significant funds 
within the United States, or use the United States as a conduit for the 
receipt of funds raised in other nations. ,,26 
As the Ninth Circuit put it, the AEDPA "has teeth." 27 First, section 
302-codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1189-gives the Secretary of State the 
power to designate an organization as a "foreign terrorist organization," 
thereby freezing all the organization's assets within the United States. 
23 U.S. Dep't of Justice Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma City and Beyond (Oct. 
2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovclpublicationsiinfores/respterrorism/chapl.html. 
24 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
25 Presidential Statement, 1996 WL 203049, at *1 (Apr. 26, 1996). 
26 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(6), 110 Stat. at 1247. 
27 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss2/4
2009] DESIGNATING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 225 
Second, because these designated organizations "are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates 
that conduct,,,28 section 303-codified at 18 U.S.c. § 2339B-makes it 
illegal to contribute "material support" to these organizations.29 Finally, 
the AEDPA authorizes exclusion and deportation of the organization's 
members and representatives from the United States.30 The following 
sections will examine each of these provisions in more detail. 
A. DESIGNATING A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
Before an organization can be designated a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization ("FTO"),31 § 1189 requires the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General 
(collectively "the Secretary"),32 to make three findings: 1) that the 
organization is "foreign;" 2) that the organization engages in "terrorist 
activity, or "retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist 
activity;" and 3) that the organization's terrorist activity threatens "the 
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United 
States.,,33 The Secretary is also authorized to designate all aliases of the 
28 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 1247. 
29 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2009); 18 U.S.c. § 23398 (2009); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182 
(2009). 
30 See generally 8 U.S.c. §§ I I 82(a)(3)(8)(i)(l); 1227(a)(4)(8), 1536 (a)(I)(A). 
31 In addition to FTO designations under AEDPA, organizations and individuals may be 
labeled as "terrorist" pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"). 
IEEPA, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., allows the President to impose a wide range of 
economic sanctions once he or she has officially declared a state of national emergency. 50 U.S.C. § 
1702 In 1995, President Clinton declared a National Emergency and signed Executive Order 12947 
prohibiting transactions with terrorists who threaten to disrupt the Middle Eastern peace process. 
Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995). Organizations designated under 
Executive Order 12947 are labeled Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT). Jd. After September 
11th, President George W. 8ush also utilized his powers under IEEPA with Executive Order 13224, 
which gives the Secretary of State together with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney 
General the power to designate foreign entity or individual who has "committed, or [) posers) a 
significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States" as a Specifically Designated 
Global Terrorist (SDGT). Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001). This 
Comment will address only FTO designations under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. There are currently at least 41 
blocked organizations under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Office of Foreign Assets Control U.S. Dep't of the 
Treasury, Terrorist Assets Report, (2006), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2006.pdf. For an alphabetical list of all 
blocked organizations and persons, which the Department of the Treasury collectively calls 
"Specifically Designated Nationals," as of July 24,2007, see 72 Fed. Reg. 40374-01 (2007). 
32 "Secretary" as used throughout the statute is defined in the statute as the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General. 8 U.S.c. § I I 89(d)(4) 
(2009). This Comment will also use the term "Secretary" to refer to those individuals collectively. 
33 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(l) (2009). 
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organization as FTOs.34 
Section 1189 does not define the tenn "foreign organization" or the 
phrase "threatens the security of United States nationals or the national 
security of the United States" for the purposes of an FTO designation.35 
Nonetheless, because the latter of these two requirements rests on a 
foreign policy decision by the Executive Branch,36 courts have found that 
element of the FTO designation completely nonjusticiable.37 "Foreign 
organization" is not defined in the statute, but whatever the definition, a 
designee is not pennitted to argue that it is a government entity rather 
than an "organization" because the determination of "who is the 
sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a 
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and 
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the 
judges ... of that govemment.,,38 
The term "terrorist activity" is defined in two places.39 The first 
definition is located at 8 U.S.C. § 1182, which defines "terrorist activity" 
as that which is (1) "unlawful under the laws of the place where it is 
committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States, 
would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State)" and 
(2) involves certain, specifically enumerated, conduct.40 Much of the 
conduct meeting this statutory definition is obvious terrorist activity such 
as highjacking an aircraft, taking hostages, assassinations, and the use of 
34 Nat'l Council of Resistance ofIran v. Dep't of State (NeRI), 251 F.3d 192,200 (D.C. Cir 
2001) ("It would simply make no sense for us to hold that Congress empowered the Secretary to 
designate a terrorist organization ... only for such periods of time as it took such organization to 
give itself a new name, and then let it happily resume the same status it would have enjoyed had it 
never been designated."); see also 8 U.S.C § 1189 (b)(I) ("The Secretary may amend a designation 
under this subsection if the Secretary finds that the organization has changed its name, adopted a 
new alias .... "). 
3S Though the statute does not define what it means to "threaten United States national 
security," 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(d)(2) does define the term "national security" as "the national defense, 
foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States." 8 U.S.c. § I I 89(d)(2) (2009). 
36 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) ("A federal court may entertain a controversy only if it is 'justiciable.' Both 
characterizations mean that a court will not a decide a question unless the nature of the action 
challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial 
determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial courts 
and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed."). 
37 See, e.g., People's Mojahedin Org. ofIran v. U.S. Dep't of State ("PM OF'), 182 F.3d 17, 
23 (D.C. CiT. 1999) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, III (1948) ("these are political judgments, 'decisions ofa kind for which the Judiciary has 
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of 
political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry. "'». 
38 PMOI, 182 F.3d at 23. 
39 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(I)(B) (2009). 
40 Id. at § I I 82(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
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biological or nuclear weapons.41 However, the "terrorist activity" 
definition is broad-sweeping, as it includes "explosive, fireann, or other 
weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary 
gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or 
more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.'.42 
Additionally, the statute provides that an attempt, conspiracy or threat to 
engage in any of the foregoing activities constitutes "terrorist activity.'.43 
The second, less-utilized definition of "terrorist activity," found at 22 
U.s.C. § 2656f, is "premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.'.44 
In making the designation under § 1189, the Secretary must compile 
an "administrative record.'.45 The Secretary has authorized the Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department ("S/CT") 
to investigate organizations for potential FTO designations.46 The S/CT 
monitors the activities of "terrorist groups" focusing "not only at the 
actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out," but also "whether 
the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future 
acts of terrorism, or retains the capability and intent to carry out such 
acts.,,47 Once such a group is identified, the S/CT compiles an 
administrative record that will show that the organization meets the 
statutory definition of "terrorist organization" described above.48 From 
here the Secretary makes the ultimate determination of whether to 
designate the organization under § 1189.49 
Nothing in the statute limits the type of evidence contained in the 
administrative record. 50 Therefore, it often consists entirely of "third 
hand accounts, press stories, material on the Internet or other hearsay 
41 Id. at § I I 82(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
42/d. at § I I 82(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b ). 
43 Id. at § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(VI). 
44 22 U.S.C. § 2656f{d)(2) (2009). 
45 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(3) (2009). 
46 Office of Counterterrorism Fact Sheet (2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ctlrls/fs/37191.htm. 
47 Secretary of State Has Key Role in Designating Terrorist Groups, State Dep't Press 
Releases & Documents (2005), available at 2005 WLNR 16595452. 
48 Secretary of State has Key Role in Designating Te"orist Groups, State Dep't Press 
Releases & Documents (2005), available at 2005 WLNR 16595452. 
49 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2009); see also Audrey Kurth Cronin, Specialist in 
Terrorism, The "FTO List" and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Te"orist Organizations, 
CRS Report for Congress (2003) ("Designations normally occur after an involved interagency 
process; but the Secretary of State makes the ultimate decision."). 
50 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(3) (2009). 
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regarding the organization's activities.,,51 Additionally, § 1189 
specifically authorizes FrO designations on the basis of classified 
information, which need not be disclosed except to certain members of 
Congress52 and courts for ex parte and in camera reviews. 53 
Unlike traditional administrative proceedings, which will be 
discussed in section II, infra, during this designation process "there is no 
adversary hearing, [and] no presentation of what courts and agencies 
think of as evidence.,,54 Nor does the statute require that the organization 
"affected by the Secretary's internal deliberations" be notified before 
designation55 or allow the designated organization the opportunity to 
present evidence in opposition to the designation. 56 Instead, the statute 
requires only that the Secretary notify certain members of Congress of 
her intent to designate, along with the factual basis for the designation,57 
and seven days later, the designation must be published in the Federal 
Register.58 
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Provided that an organization files a petition within thirty days of 
the FrO designation, § 1189 does provide for judicial review. 59 
However, this review is extremely limited.60 Only the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has the authority to review 
these designations.61 Additionally, this court may reverse a designation 
only if, on the basis of the administrative record alone,62 the designation 
is found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
51 People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State ("PMOf'), 182 F.3d 17, 18-19 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
52 8 U.S.C. § I 189(a)(3)(B) (2009). 
53 Id. at § I I 89(c)(2); see a/so PMOI, 182 F.3d 17; People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. 
United States Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
54 PMOJ, 182 F.3d at 19. 
55 Id. at 21 n.S. 
56 Jd. at 19. 
57 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(2)(A)(i) (2009). 
58 Id. at § I I 89(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
59 Id. at § 1189(c)(l). The original provision was codified in 1996 at 8 U.S.C. § I 189(b)(l). 
60 This section led an obviously frustrated court in POMI, to preface its review with this 
comment: "At this point in a judicial opinion, appellate courts often layout the 'facts.' We will not, 
cannot, do so in these cases. What follows ... mayor may not be facts. The information recited is 
certainly not evidence of the sort that would normally be received in court. It is instead material the 
Secretary of State compiled as a record, from sources named and unnamed, the accuracy of which 
we have no way of evaluating." PMOJ, 182 F.3d at 19. 
61 8 U.S.C. § I 189(c)(I) (2009). 
62 Id. at § I I 89(c)(2). 
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otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, 
power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right; (4) lacking substantial 
support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified 
information submitted in the court; or (5) not in accord with the 
procedures required by law.63 A designation has "substantial support" if 
the record provides "a sufficient basis for a reasonable person to 
conclude" that the organization was guilty of the alleged acts.64 The 
court may only look to see if the findings are supported in the record but 
not whether the findings in the record are supported by reliable 
evidence.65 
C. EFFECT OF THE DESIGNATION 
Once a designation has taken effect there are several immediate and 
drastic consequences. This Comment will focus on the three most 
consequential. First, all of the organization's assets are immediately 
frozen. 66 Second, it becomes illegal for any person to knowingly provide 
the designated organization with "material support,,,67 which actually 
includes any support, no matter how insignificant,68 Lastly, this 
designation has devastating effects on admission into and deportation 
from the United States for non-citizens.69 
1. Freezing Assets 
As soon as the Secretary informs Congress of her intent to designate 
an organization as an FTO, the Secretary of the Treasury may require 
domestic financial institutions that possess assets of the organization to 
63 Id. at § I I 89(c)(3)(A)-(E). 
64 Chai v. Dep't of State, 466 F.3d 125, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing PMOI, 182 F.3d at 25). 
65 See PMOI, 182 F.3d at 25 ("We reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the 
material before the Secretary is or is not true .... [T]he record consists entirely of hearsay, none of it 
was ever subjected to adversary testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the 
organizations affected. As we see it, our only function is to decide if the Secretary, on the face of 
things, had enough information before her to come to the conclusion that the organizations were 
foreign and engaged in terrorism."). 
66 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(2)(C) (2009). 
67 18 U.S.C. § 23398 (2009). 
68 SHAINA ABER ET AL., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE REFUGEE FACT-
FINDING INVESTIGATION 18 (May 2006) ("material support" is a legal term of art that means any 
support, no matter how insignificant) (citing Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 
2004». 
69 See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(8)(i)(I); 1227(a)(4)(8), 1536 (a)(I)(A)(2009). 
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block all transactions involving such assets. 70 Any domestic financial 
institution that possesses or controls assets of the organization must seize 
the funds and report their existence to the Secretary or be subject to civil 
penalty.71 
2. Criminalizing "Material Support" to the Organization 
As soon as a designation is published in the Federal Register, § 
2339B takes effect, and it becomes illegal to knowingly provide 
"material support or resources" to the organization.72 "Material support 
or resources" is defined broadly as follows: 
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency 
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
I d . .. 73 d . . 74 fi h f: I o gmg, trammg, expert a VIce or assIstance, sa e ouses, a se 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (lor more 
individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 75 
70 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(2)(C) (2009). 
71 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2) (2009); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b) (2009) ("Any financial institution 
that knowingly fails to comply with subsection (a)(2) shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount 
that is the greater of- (A) $50,000 per violation; or (B) twice the amount of which the financial 
institution was required under subsection (a)(2) to retain possession or control."). 
72 To "knowingly" contribute material support a defendant must either (I) know that the 
organization was designated as an FTO, or (2) know that the organization engages in "terrorist 
activity" or "terrorism" as defined above. 18 U.S.C. § 23398(a)(\) (2009). As the statute was 
originally drafted, however, "knowingly" was not defined and the statute simply made it a crime to 
knowingly provide material support or resources. 18 U.s.c. § 2339B (\996). This led some courts 
to conclude that a specific intent to further the illegal aims of the organization was required. See 
United States v. AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from punishment in the absence of personal guilt required the court to 
read into the statute a specific intent to further the illegal aims of the organization). However, the 
current definition of "knowingly" appears to incorporate the ruling of the Ninth Circuit in 
Humanitarian Law Project, which found in light of the long adhered-to "principle that '[t]he 
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, principles of Anglo-American 
criminal jurisprudence.' . .. when Congress included the term 'knowingly' in § 23398, it meant that 
proof that a defendant knew of the organization's designation as a terrorist organization or proof that 
a defendant knew of the unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated." Humanitarian Law 
Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 398 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, Humanitarian Law 
Project v. U.s. Dep't of Justice, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1130-33 (9th Cir. 2007). 
73 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b )(2) (2009) ('''training' means instruction or teaching designed to 
impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge."). 
74 1d. (defining "expert advice or assistance" as "advice or assistance derived from scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge"). 
7S 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(\) (2009). 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss2/4
2009] DESIGNATING TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 231 
Congress intended the exceptions for medicine or religious 
materials to be construed narrowly.76 The punishment for a violation of 
§ 2339B was no more than ten years in prison, as originally drafted under 
AEDPA.77 That punishment has now been increased to fifteen years,78 
and Congress has recently considered increasing it to twenty-five years.79 
Violation of § 2339B also gives rise to civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 
233380 and constitutes a "crime of violence" under the Bail Reform 
Act,8l which allows pre-trial detention.82 Additionally, § 2339B applies 
extraterritorialll3 when certain jurisdictional predicates are present. 84 
3. Alien InadmisSibility and Removal 
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, any alien who provides "material support" 
to a designated FTO is ineligible for entry into the United States.85 The 
76 H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-518, at 114 ("'Medicine' should be understood to be limited to 
the medicine itself, and does not include the vast array of medical supplies. 'Religious materials' ... 
[is] limited to those religious articles typically used during customary and time-honored rituals or 
teachings of a particular faith, denomination, or sect. "). 
77 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303(a), 110 Stat. at 1250. 
78 18 U.S.C. § 23398(a)(I) (2009). 
79 See 2007 CONG US HR 2376 (May 17th 2007); 2007 CONG US S 1320 (May 07, 2007). 
80 80im v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885,895 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
81 U.S. v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 
82 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) (2009). 
83 [d. at § 23398(d)(2) (2009); see also Alexander J. Urbelis, Rethinking Extraterritorial 
Prosecution in the War on Terror: Examining the Unintentional Yet Foreseeable Consequences of 
Extraterritorially Criminalizing the Provision of Material Support to Terrorist and Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 22 CONN. J. INT'L L. 313 (2007) (discussing the harmful effects on the 
ability to gather counter-terrorism information when extraterritorial jurisdiction does not predicate 
the terrorist act). 
84 18 U.S.C. § 23398(d)(1) (2009) ("There is jurisdiction over an offense under subsection 
(a) if-{A) an offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. llOl(a)(22») or an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States (as defined in section IOI(a)(20) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20»); (8) an offender is a stateless person whose habitual 
residence is in the United States; (C) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is 
brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside 
the United States; (D) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States; (E) the offense 
occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; or (F) an offender aids or abets any person over 
whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an offense under subsection (a) or 
conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an offense 
under subsection (a)."). 
85 8 U.S.c. § I I 82(a)(3)(8)(i)(I) (2009) (providing that an alien who "engages in terrorist 
activity" is inadmissible to the United States); see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(8)(iv)(VI)(cc) (2009) 
(defining "terrorist activity" as knowingly affording "material support, including a safe house, 
transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false 
documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), 
explosives, or training" to a foreign terrorist organization designated under § 1189). 
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tenn "material support" is defined less broadly in § 1182 than in § 1189, 
but it has been interpreted just as expansively. 86 This provision has been 
interpreted to include individuals who merely provide food and shelter to 
members of designated terrorist organizations.87 Aliens who contribute 
"material support" are also deportable.88 Pending a removal hearing, the 
alien may be detained,89 and the removal proceeding may be based 
entirely on classified information.90 Additionally, aliens who provide 
terrorists "material support" are ineligible for asylum.91 As with all of 
these provisions, this law applies regardless of whether the support was 
provided under duress.92 
Given all of these far-reaching and devastating consequences of 
designation under § 1189, this statute provides significant tools to fight 
86 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2009) (material support includes "a safe 
house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, 
false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological 
weapons), explosives, or training") with 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(l) (2009) ("the term 'material 
support or resources' means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or 
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include 
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials."). 
87 Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 FJd 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2004). 
88 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2009) ("Any alien who is described in subparagraph (B) or (F) 
of section I I 82(a)(3) of this title is deportable."). 
89 8 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(I)(A) (2009). This applies to lawful pennanent residents as well, 
although these aliens are entitled to a release hearing where they only be released if they can show 
that (I) they are a lawful resident; (2) they are not likely to flee if released; and (3) they "will not 
endanger national security, or the safety of any person or the community, if released." 8 U.S. C. § 
1536 (a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (2009). 
90 8 U.S.c. § 1533 (c)(I)(A) (2009) ("In determining whether to grant [the removal] 
application under this section, a single judge of the removal court may consider, ex parte and in 
camera, in addition to the information contained in the application ... other information, including 
classified information, presented under oath or affirmation .... "). While there is a waiver clause 
that allows the Secretary to forgo application of the "material support" clause with respect to 
admissibility and deportation of aliens, it does not apply to those aliens who are already in removal 
proceedings. 8 U.S.c. § I I 82(d)(3)(B)(i) (2009). Therefore, as a practical matter the waiver, even 
during its broadest application, is not likely to benefit very many aliens. See Margaret D. Stock, 
Providing Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization: The Pentagon, the Department of 
State, the People's Mujahedin of Iran, & the Global War on Terrorism, BENDER'S IMMIGRATION 
BULLETIN (2006). 
91 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(2)(A)(v) (2009) (asylum will not be granted if "the alien is described 
in subclause (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of section 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) of this title or section 
I 227(a)(4)(B) of this title (relating to terrorist activity) .... "). 
92 SHAINA ABER ET AL., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE REFUGEE FACT-
FINDING INVESTIGATION (May 2006) (citing In re R.K., Oral Opinion, Judge Mirlande Tadal, United 
States Immigration Court, Elizabeth, New Jersey (May 9,2005»; see also Stein, Kara Beth, Female 
Refugees: Re-Victimized by the material Support to Terrorism Bar, 38 MCGEORGE L. REv. 815, 
823-27 (2007) (discussing especially harmful effects this law has on immigrant women). 
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terrorism. This is a good thing if it is applied only to true "terrorist 
organizations." However, because the statute does not provide even the 
most basic procedural safeguards to the organization, it is difficult to 
ensure that only terrorist organizations are blacklisted, criminalized, and 
bankrupted through this process. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT 
This section will discuss the ongm and scope of some of the 
procedural safeguards required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Because FTO designations are administrative 
determinations,93 the following analysis will focus on the requirements of 
due process in the context of administrative adjudication.94 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that no person shall 
be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.,,95 
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as having both a 
substantive and a procedural component. The substantive component 
limits the way in which government can restrict individual freedoms. 96 
93 As discussed earlier, FTOs are designated by the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1 I 89(a){l), (d)(4) (2009). Each 
of these individuals is an appointed leader of a federal agency. The Secretary of State is the head of 
the U.S. Department of State. See http://www.state.gov/. The Secretary or the Treasury is the head 
of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. See http://www.treasury.gov/. The Attorney General is the 
head of the Department of Justice. See http://www.usdoj.gov/agl. 
94 In a given administrative proceeding there may be both statutory and constitutional 
requirements for procedural due process protections. The statutory requirements, found in the 
Administrative Proceeding Act ("APA"), require that in "every case of adjudication required by 
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 554 et 
seq. (2009). The hearing must comply with certain procedures. !d. These guidelines include 
specific requirements for notice of the potential deprivation, access to as well as an opportunity to 
meet the government's evidence, and limitations on certain combinations of investigative and 
adjudicative function. [d. Also included are guidelines for the types of evidence that may be used. 
5 U.S.C. § 556 (2009). Whether a statute uses language that will trigger the application of the APA 
is a "matter of statutory interpretation" and "[c]courts differ over whether to defer to an agency's 
interpretation that a particular statute does not require formal adjudication." AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, 
SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, A BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL 
ADMlNISTRA TIVE LAW 6 (2004). As discussed in section I, § 1189 only requires the Secretary to 
compile an administrative record and it does not require a hearing at all. For these reasons, the 
procedural requirements under APA probably do not apply, though they are still useful guidance for 
the type of hearing that may be required under the constitutional protections of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
9S U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
96 This component is known as "substantive due process." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327,337 (l986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Due Process Clause contains "a substantive component, 
sometimes referred to as 'substantive due process,' which bars certain arbitrary government actions 
'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."'). 
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The procedural component ensures a certain minimum amount of process 
that is due before a person is deprived of "life, liberty, or property.,,97 
Procedural due process is one of the most fundamental concepts in 
American jurisprudence.98 However, "process" is not required every 
time the state asserts its authority over an individua1.99 Due process is 
not a rigid principle, and its protections vary depending on the facts 
involved. 100 Therefore, when analyzing an alleged violation of due 
process, there are three distinct questions that must be addressed: 
whether, what, and when. lol 
Whether a person is entitled to procedural due process under the 
Constitution depends upon a determination that the government is acting 
to deprive the person of an interest recognized by the Due Process 
Clause-life, liberty or property. \02 In the case of FTO designations, an 
additional question of whether a person is entitled to due process arises 
because the person deprived is a non-citizen. In these situations, the 
person (i.e., the organization) must establish sufficient connections with 
the United States to afford it protections under the Constitution. \03 
Lastly, because the Due Process Clause is flexible and provides different 
levels of protection depending on the circumstances of the deprivation, 
the next two questions that must be answered are what due process 
requires and when. 104 
A. WHETHER DUE PROCESS IS DUE 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of the law. lOS Therefore, 
97 This component is known as "procedural due process." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327,337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Due Process Clause also "is a guarantee of fair procedure, 
sometimes referred to as 'procedural due process': the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a 
defendant without giving him a fair trial, nor may it take property without providing appropriate 
procedural safeguards.") (footnote omitted). 
98 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
99 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWARK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 593 (3d ed. & 1999 
Supp 2007). 
100 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
101 See, e.g., Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State (NCRI), 251 F.3d 192,205 
(D.C. Cir 2001). 
102 See, e.g., id. at 203-04. 
103 People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State ("PMOf'), 182 F.3d 17,22 (D.C. 
Cir.1999). 
104 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) ("'(D)ue process is flexible and 
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,'.") (quoting Morrissey V. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972)). 
lOS U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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there are two basic prerequisites for its protection: (1) one must be a 
"person" within the meaning of this clause, and (2) there must be a 
deprivation of one of the enumerated rights. 
A "person" under the Constitution is not limited to citizens. 
Instead, it applies to "all persons within the territorial jurisdiction.,,106 A 
person within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States includes 
people who are physically presentl07 or who own property within the 
United States. 108 Thus, courts sometimes describe this requirement as 
having "presence" withinl09 or "substantial connections" with the United 
States. IIO Without presence in the United States, the Due Process Clause 
does not offer any protections. III 
Similarly, the Due Process Clause does not apply unless the state 
has deprivedl12 the person of "life, liberty, or property."l\3 What 
constitutes "life, liberty, or property" has given rise to extensive 
commentary; however, some basic principles are beyond dispute. "Life" 
is that period after birth1l4 and before the cessation of brain activity.115 
"Liberty" includes "any fonn of action or choice which is accorded 
constitutional recognition by the COurt.,,116 There are two ways the 
106 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
107 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950); see also Kwong Hai Chew v. 
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953). 
108 Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d 106, III (1966) ("[T]he Court has 
declared unequivocally, with respect to non-resident aliens owning property within the United 
States, that they 'as well as citizens are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment. "') 
(quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942)); see also Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 
U.S. 308, 318 (1952) ("friendly aliens are protected by the Fifth Amendment requirement of just 
compensation. "). 
109 Nat'l Council of Resistance ofiran v. Dep't of State (NCRI), 251 F.3d 192, 200-01 (D.C. 
Cir 2001). 
110 U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,271 (1990). 
III People's Mojahedin Org. ofiran v. U.S. Dep't of State ("PMOf'), 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). 
112 A deprivation is an intentional state action that has an adverse effect on one of these 
protected interests. AMERICAN BAR Ass 'N, SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, 
A BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, (2004); see also Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) ("The Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a 
negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property."). 
113 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
114 In Roe v. Wade the court held that an unborn fetus was not a "person" under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This Comment will not attempt to tackle the 
debate surround the meaning and confines of the term "life." 
115 Although the Supreme Court has not dealt with the issue, in People v. Eulo the highest 
court in New York held that "death" could be either the cessation of breathing, or when breathing is 
artificially maintained, the cessation of brain activity. People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 346 (1984). 
116 RONALD D. ROTIlNDA & JOHN E. Now ARK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 27 (3d ed. & 1999 
Supp 2007). 
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government can deprive a person of "liberty." The first is through 
physical restraint, such as imprisonment. 117 The second is by limiting a 
person's freedom of choice by criminalizing or penalizing a substantive 
right,118 which is "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental. ",119 Finally, "property" certainly 
includes all traditional forms of real and personal property.120 It also 
includes government benefits such as welfare,121 disability benefits, 122 
and government employment. 123 
Without these basic prerequisites, the Due Process Clause does not 
provide any procedural protection whatsoever. Assuming the state has 
deprived a person of life, liberty, or property, the Due Process Clause 
does not offer the same protections for all deprivations. Therefore, the 
next question is what procedural protections are required. 
B. WHAT DUE PROCESS REQUIRES AND WHEN-THE MA THEWS 
TEST 
Due process is "'flexible and calls for such procedural protections 
as the particular situation demands. ",124 Ultimately, the procedure must 
be fundamentally fair to the individual in the resolution of the factual and 
legal basis for government actions that deprive him of life, liberty or 
property.125 Therefore, the determination of what "due process may 
require under any given set of circumstances begins with a determination 
of precise nature of government function involved as well as private 
interests that have been affected by governmental action.,,126 In 
II? Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("Freedom from bodily restraint has always 
been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental 
action."). 
118 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390,399 (1923}). 
119 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
291 U.S. 97, 105 (I 934} (Cardozo, 1.)}. 
120 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWARK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69 (3d ed. & 1999 
Supp 2007). 
121 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
122 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (l976). 
123 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (I 997}. 
124 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471,481 (1972». 
125 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWARK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 100 (3d ed. & 1999 
Supp 2007). 
126 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); see also Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) ("The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded [to] 
the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' and 
depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental 
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administrative proceedings many, if not most, of the formal requirements 
of a trial will not be required under the Due Process Clause. 127 While a 
full trial-like hearing is not often required in the context of administrative 
adjudication,128 these proceedings still must provide the "fundamental 
requiste of due process of law" of notice and an opportunity to be heard 
upon such notice 129 in front of an unbiased adjudicator. 130 
interest in summary adjudication. Accordingly ... 'consideration of what procedures due process 
may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise 
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected 
by governmental action.''') (citations omitted). 
1272 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 613-15 (4th ed. 2002). There 
are perhaps twenty elements to a formal "trial-type" hearing: 
(1) 'timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proposed termination,' (2) 'an 
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses,' (3) oral presentation 
of arguments, (4) oral presentation of evidence, (5) cross-examination of adverse witnesses, 
(6) disclosure to the claimant of opposing evidence, (7) the right to retain an attorney, (8) a 
determination resting 'solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing,' (9) 'the 
decisionmaker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate that evidence he 
relied on'," ... (10) 'an impartial decisionmaker ... (11) 'a complete record.' (12) 'a 
comprehensive opinion,' (13) counsel provided by the government, ... (14) 'a full opinion or 
even formal finding of fact and conclusions of law.' ... (15) a jury trial, (16) a right to 
appeal to a higher authority, (17) a right to subpoena witnesses and evidence and a right of 
discovery, (18) a hearing open to the public, including the press, (19) proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and (20) protection against undue delay. 
CHARLES H. KOCK, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 65 (2d ed. 1997) (quoting Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
128 Prior to 1970, the courts rarely considered this question of what kind of "hearing" was 
required. 2 RlCHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 615 (4th ed. 2002). Once the 
courts concluded that the Due Process Clause applied, it found that a "hearing" was necessary but 
did not address what kind of hearing was required. Id. at 613. However, with the abandonment of 
the "rights" vs. "privileges" distinction the protections of the Due Process Clause were being applied 
to an ever growing arena of administrative actions, which up until that time were viewed as 
privileges not entitled to Constitutional protection. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 
518 U.S. 712, 716-17 (1996); see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege 
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). Therefore, the question became 
what was required when the State deprived persons of these new, broader, concepts of property and 
liberty. The pivotal case came in 1970 when the Supreme Court held that a hearing was required 
before the state could terminate welfare benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
Following this case, there was a "due process explosion" in which the lower courts struggled to 
determine what due process required. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 
1267, 1268 (1975). In 1975, Judge Henry Friendly wrote that three most important procedural 
safeguards, fundamental to fair adjudicatory decision-making, are (1) an unbiased tribunal; (2) notice 
of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it; and (3) an opportunity to present reasons why 
the proposed action should not be taken. Id. at 1279-81 (listing eleven basic elements of a fair 
hearing in order of priority). 
129 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 
233 (1944); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976); Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 116 
(1996); Nat'l Council of Resistance ofIran v. Dep't of State (NeRI), 251 F.3d 192, 200-09 (D.C. Cir 
2001). 
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In the landmark decision of Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme 
Court articulated the modern test for determining whether a particular 
procedural safeguard is required, and when it is required under the Due 
Process Clause. 131 In Mathews v. Eldridge, Justice Powell developed a 
test for evaluating when the Due Process Clause has been violated 
because of the omission of one or more procedural safeguards. 
Synthesizing recent Supreme Court cases, Justice Powell found that the 
analysis must balance three factors. The first is the "private interest" 
affected by the official action, which requires a consideration of both the 
degree and the length of the potential deprivation. 132 The second factor 
is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the 
procedures used as well as the probable value, if any, of additional 
procedural safeguards. 133 This factor takes into consideration the risk 
inherent in the truth finding process; 134 the degree to which the person is 
given "access to the information relied upon by the state agency in 
making the determination" and an opportunity to respond to the 
determination made by the agency;135 and lastly, the existence of an 
appeal procedure after the determination and the rate of success of those 
appeals. 136 The third and final factor is "the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.,,137 
Because due process is flexible, the Mathews balancing test assesses 
the necessity of a given procedural due process protection. Although the 
Court has articulated other tests for determining the adequacy of due 
process protections, the Mathews test is the basic test to be used in most 
circumstances 138 and particularly in the context of administrative 
proceedings. 139 The Mathews test is also the proper test to apply to FTO 
130 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process. "). 
131 Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
132 Id. at 341. 
133 I d. at 333. 
134 Id. at 344. 
135 Id. at 335-46. 
136 I d. at 346-47. 
137 Id. at 334. 
138 State of California ex reI. Lockyer v. F.E.R.C., 329 F.3d 700, 709 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (it is 
also a general test to be applied in most other contexts except in rare circumstances). 
139 Girard v. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1991) (the Mathews test is "the 
standard for determining whether certain challenged administrative procedures comply with the 
requirements of due process."). In Dusenbery. the Court noted that the Mathews test was never 
meant to guide all questions of due process. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2001). 
That case involved the adequacy of the FBI's notice to a federal prisoner. Id. at 163. Rather than 
applying Mathews, the Court held that the Mullane test of reasonableness was more appropriate. Id. 
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designation proceedings under § 1189. 140 
III. SECTION 1189 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DEPRIVES ORGANIZATIONS 
WITH PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES DUE PROCESS UNDER THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
With this background on procedural due process in mind, section III 
will first address the circumstances under which potentially designated 
FTOs are entitled to due process protection. Second, this section will 
show that when an organization is entitled to protection under the 
Constitution, § 1189 does not meet the basic requirements of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Lastly, section I1I(C) will show 
that although the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia has interpreted the statute to include some due process 
protections, these protections are not sufficient. Application of the 
Mathews balancing test reveals that the demands of the Due Process 
Clause require not only notice of the impending designation, but also an 
opportunity for the organization to present its case before an unbiased 
tribunal. 
A. QUALIFYING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
The first question that must be addressed is whether organizations 
designated under § 1189 are entitled to due process. This requires not 
only a deprivation of life, liberty or property, but also, because they are 
likely to be foreign organizations, enough presence to be entitled to 
Constitutional protection. In the case of an FTO designation, these two 
questions of whether the organization is entitled to protections under the 
Due Process Clause are likely to be related. Many potentially designated 
organizations will not have physical presence within the United States 
because by definition they are foreign. However, they may have 
at 167. Additionally, some courts have applied the Calero-Toledo test to determine the sufficiency 
of the procedure to designate SDGT's under Executive Order 13,224. Holy Land Found. for Relief 
& Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974}). 
140 Nat'l Council of Resistance oflran v. Dep't of State (NCR!), 251 F.3d 192, 206 (D.C. Cir 
2001). The Mathews test is superior to the other tests articulated by the Court for several reasons. 
First, unlike the other tests, it was fashioned specifically for administrative proceedings. See 
generally Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Second, it was created after the Calero-Toledo 
test and is better equipped to weight the precise issues involved in administrative designations. 
Compare Mathews with Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663 (1974). Finally, the courts have consistently 
used the Mathews test to evaluate due process considerations in FTO designations. Compare NCRI, 
251 F.3d at 206, with People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) andChai v. Dep't of State, 466 F.3d 125 (D.c. Cir. 2006). 
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"substantial connections" through money in U.S. bank accounts or other 
property within the United States. 141 
In NCRI, it was enough to trigger the application of the Due Process 
Clause that the NCR! had an "overt presence within the National Press 
Building in Washington, D.C.," and claimed "an interest in a small bank 
account.,,142 However, as will often be the case, the court noted that 
much of its determination rested on classified evidence that it could not 
reveal. 143 Still, statistics from the Department of Treasury indicate that 
many potential FTOs have substantial assets within the United States. 144 
Because § 1189 provides that upon designation all assets must be 
blocked, this property interest will also likely be the constitutionally 
protected right that is deprived upon designation. 145 Without this 
connection to the United States, the organization has no due process 
protections and is entitled only to statutory protections. 146 Assuming the 
question is resolved in a manner that entitles an organization to the 
protections of the Constitution, the following analysis will show that the 
basic standards imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution are not present in § 1189. 
B. SECTION 1189 FAILS TO PROVIDE EVEN THE MOST BASIC 
REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS 
The most basic and fundamental requirements of due process are 
notice of the proposed government action, an opportunity to meet and 
refute the government's case, and a neutral tribunal to adjudicate the 
proposed government action. 147 Section 1189 fails to meet even these 
141 The organization will not, however, be able to rely on its members' ownership of property 
within the United States. See 32 County Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he affidavits petitioners submitted in this case demonstrate only that some of 
their American 'members' personally rented post office boxes and utilized a bank account to 
transmit funds and information to 32 County and the Association in Ireland. The affidavits do not 
aver that either organization possessed any controlling interest in property located within the United 
States, nor do they demonstrate any other form of presence here."). 
142 NCRl, 251 F.3d at 201. 
143 !d. at 202. 
144 See, e.g., OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT CALENDAR YEAR 2006 FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REpORT TO 
CONGRESS ON ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES OF TERRORIST COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNEES, available a/ 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reportsitar2006.pdf ("As of December 31, 2006, 
assets blocked pursuant to Executive Orders 12947, 13099, and 13224 totaled $16,413,733.80"). 
145 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(2)(C) (2009). 
146 People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State ("PMOf'), 182 F.3d 17,23 (D.C. 
Cir.1999). 
147 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-81 (1975) 
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most basic and fundamental aspects of due process. First, there is no 
requirement in § 1189 that the Secretary notify the organization of the 
designation prior to the actual designation. 148 Although § 1189 does 
provide for notice in the Federal Register, once this occurs the 
consequences of designation immediately take effect. 149 Therefore, the 
publication in the Federal Register is not pre-deprivation notice because 
the moment it is published is also the moment of the deprivation. 
Second, even if the organization was notified, the statute does not require 
the Secretary to provide a hearing before the designation is 
effectuated. 150 The organization is not given the opportunity to refute the 
Secretary's evidence or to present its own evidence proving that it is not 
a "terrorist organization.,,151 
C. THE ADDITIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED 
BY NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN 
Almost immediately after Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright 
published the first batch of FTOs in the Federal Register, the People's 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran ("PMOI',)152 began challenging its 
designation. 153 In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia found that an organization with sufficient connection to the 
United States has the right to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.,,154 
(listing eleven basic elements of a fair hearing in order of priority, the first three being those listed 
above in the text). 
148 NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208. 
149 8 U .S.C. § I I 89(a)(2)(ii) (2009). 
150 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2009). Section 1189 does outline a procedure for revoking 
FTO designations after they are in effect. However, this is only done only after a two-year delay and 
does not review previous designation, but instead determines whether the situation has changed such 
that the designation is no longer appropriate. 8 U.S.C. §1189(b) (2009). 
151 PMOI, 182 F.3d at 19. 
152 The PMOI has several names. PMOI is often abbreviated as MEK and is frequently 
identified in this way by the government and the media. The group also goes by the name 
Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organisation (MKO). People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran V. U.S. Dep't of State, 
182 F.3d 17,20 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The U.S. government has maintained that the National 
Council Resistance of Iran (NCRI) is an alias for the PMOI; however, that is something both the 
PMOI and the NCR! deny. 72 Fed. Reg. 40374-01 40599 ("People's Mujahedin Organization of 
Iran (a.k.a .. National Council of Resistance (NCR)) .... "). 
153 After being officially designated an FTO in 1997, the PMOI petitioned for review, arguing 
that § 1189 denied it due process under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. PMOI, 182 F.3d 
at 22. This would be the beginning of a long series of challenges to § 1189's procedure for 
designating groups as FTOs. See PMOI, 182 F.3d 17; NCRI, 251 F.3d 192; People's Mojahedin 
Org. oflran V. U.S. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. CiT. 2003); National Council of Resistance 
ofiran V. Dep't of State, 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
154 NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333 (1976)). 
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The PMOI is an Iranian activist organization that seeks to overthrow 
the current government of Iran and establish a non-theocratic republic. ISS 
The first time it challenged the designation, the D.C. Circuit found that it 
was not entitled to due process protections because it lacked presence in 
the United States. IS6 When the PMOI was re-designated as an FTO in 
1999, the Secretary listed the National Council of Resistance of Iran 
(''NCRI'') as its alias. ls7 The PMOI, together with the NCRI, again 
argued that the FTO designation, without notice or a hearing, violated 
their due process rights under the Constitution. ISS 
First, the court addressed whether the organization was entitled to 
due process protections. ls9 The NCRI had an interest in a U.S. bank, 
which the court determined to be sufficient presence within U.S. 
territory. 160 Because the two groups were one, according to the 
Secretary, each had sufficient presence within the United States to be 
entitled to protection under the Constitution. 161 Since their property 
interest was frozen by the FTO designation, the court also found the 
organizations had been deprived of "property" by § 1189. 162 The court 
then used the Mathews balancing test to determine whether the Secretary 
m Mears, Bill, Justices Won't Intervene in Te"or Case, CNN LAW CENTER, Jan. 8, 2007, 
available at http://www.cnn.coml2007ILAW/01l0S/scotus.terror/. 
156 PMOI, 182 F.3d at 22. Therefore the court merely examined the administrative record 
compiled by the Secretary to determine whether it contained "substantial" support that the 
organizations engaged in terrorist activity; "not surprisingly," it did. Id at 24. After reluctantly 
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the very narrow ruling it was making: "we reach no 
judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material before the Secretary is or is not true ... [h]er 
conclusion might be mistaken, but that depends on the quality of the information in the reports she 
received-something we have no way of judging." Id. at 25; see also id. at 19 ("At this point in a 
judicial opinion, appellate courts often layout the 'facts.' We will not, cannot, do so in these cases. 
What follows in the next two subsections mayor may not be facts. The information recited is 
certainly not evidence of the sort that would normally be received in court. It is instead material the 
Secretary of State compiled as a record, from sources named and unnamed, the accuracy of which 
we have no way of evaluating. "). 
157 NCRI, 251 F.3d at 197. 
IS8 Id. at 200. 
159 [d. at 200-05. 
160 [d. at 201. The court could not reveal many of the facts that led to this conclusion, as 
much of it was apparently based on classified information. !d. at 202 ("[W]e have reviewed the 
entire record including the classified information and determine that NCRI can rightly lay claim to 
having come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this 
country. We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified 
material. As we noted above and in People's Mojahedin, we will not and cannot disclose the 
contents of the record. "). 
161 [d. at 202 ("Insofar as PMOI's claimed presence is concerned, the United States is now 
hoist with its own petard. The Secretary concluded in her designation, which we upheld for the 
reasons set forth above, that the NCRI and the PMOI are one. The NCRI is present in the United 
States. If A is B, and B is present, then A is present also."). 
162 [d. at 204. 
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was required to implement the additional procedural safeguards sought 
by the groups. 163 Thus, the court looked at the private interests 
implicated by the government action, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
and the government or public's interests. 
Under the first factor, the court only acknowledged the 
organizations' small interest in the bank account. l64 Although the 
Mathews test is a balancing test designed to weigh, comparatively, the 
interests at stake, the court declined to address whether the organization 
could assert its members' constitutional rightS. 16S The court seemed to 
confuse the issue of whether the Due Process Clause was triggered with 
what the Due Process Clause required. 166 Therefore, after finding a 
property interest affected by the designation, the court simply moved on 
to the second prong of the Mathews test. 167 The court disagreed with the 
Secretary's argument that the risk of erroneous deprivation is diminished 
because prior to the designations members of Congress are informed.168 
The court found that notice must be given to the person affected by the 
government action. 169 As for the third Mathews factor, the government 
or public's interests, the court found that while the Secretary's interest in 
national security was undoubtedly strong, providing notice and an 
opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation would not implicate that 
interest. 170 This was especially true because the court was not granting 
the organization access to the classified portion of the administrative 
record, but merely the information that would, in any event, be made 
163 [d. at 204-09. 
164 [d. at 206. 
16S [d. at 205 ("On each of the second and third consequences, each side offers plausible 
arguments. But we need not decide as an initial matter whether those consequences invade Fifth 
Amendment protected rights of liberty, because the invasion of the Fifth Amendment protected 
property right in the first consequence is sufficient to entitle petitioners to the due process oflaw."). 
166 See, e.g., Eric Broxmeyer, The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due 
Process and the Designation of Foreign Te"orist Organizations under the Anti-Te"orism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY, 1. INT'L L. 439, 466 (arguing the same); Joshua Ellis, 
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the AEPA: The National Council Court 
E"ed in Requiring Pre-Designation Process, 2002 BYU L. REv. 675, 699-701. 
167 NCR!, 251 F .3d at 206. 
168 [d. at 207. 
169 [d. at 207 ("[T]he involvement of more than one of the servants of that unitary executive in 
commencing a deprivation does not create an apparent substitute for the notice requirement inherent 
in the constitutional norm. Neither is it apparent how notice by the Article II branch of government 
to representatives of the Article I branch can substitute for notice to the person deprived. Again, the 
government has offered nothing that apparently weighs in favor of a post-deprivational as opposed to 
pre-deprivational compliance with due process requirements of the Constitution."). 
170 [d. at 208 ("It is particularly difficult to discern how such a notice could interfere with the 
Secretary's legitimate goals were it presented to an entity such as the PMOI concerning its 
redesignation. "). 
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public at the time of the court's judicial review. 171 
Having considered the Mathews factors, the court required two 
basic elements of due process. First, the court required notice of the 
impending designation to the organization. The notice was to be made 
"as soon as the Secretary has reached a tentative determination that the 
designation is impending" and was to include the unclassified 
information that formed the basis for the designation. 172 The court also 
acknowledged that in some circumstances notice may be postponed until 
after the deprivation; however, this required "an adequate showing to the 
court" that a pre-designation notice "would impinge upon the security 
and other foreign policy goals of the United States.,,173 Second, the court 
required that the organization be given an "opportunity to be heard.,,174 
This did not mean a jury trial, but the "opportunity to present, at least in 
written form," evidence both to "rebut the administrative record" and to 
"negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist organizations.,,175 
Because the NCR! had not been given these protections, the court 
remanded with instructions for the Secretary to retroactively provide the 
NCR! an opportunity to present its case. 176 
. It has been seven years since the NCRI ruling.177 In the few 
171 !d. at 208-09. 
172 Id. at 209. 
173 Id. at 208. 
174 Id. at 208. 
175 Id. at 209. 
176 Id. Contrary to statutory command, after finding that the NCR! was deprived of its due 
process rights, the court did not vacate the designation. !d. ("We recognize that a strict and 
immediate application of the principles of law which we have set forth herein could be taken to 
require a revocation of the designations before us. However, we also recognize the realities of the 
foreign policy and national security concerns asserted by the Secretary in support of those 
designations. We further recognize the timeline against which all are operating: the two-year 
designations before us expire in October of this year. We therefore do not order the vacation of the 
existing designations, .... "). This meant that although the court had found that the designation had 
been made in violation of the organizations Constitutional rights all prosecutions for "material 
support" under § 23398 and immigration proceedings under § 1182 remained in place. See, e.g., 
U.S. v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2005). While the court in U.S. v. Rahmani, 209 F. 
Supp.2d 1045, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2002) found that a 23398 prosecution could not stand on the basis 
of an designation made in violation of the Due Process Clause, that decision was overturned by 
Afshari, 426 F.3d at 1157-58. But see U.S. v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (the "net result" of majority's decision "is that Rahmani is being criminally prosecuted, 
and almost certainly will be convicted, for contributing to an organization that has been designated 
as terrorist with none of the protections that are constitutionally required for such a designation. 
Worse, Rahmani will in all likelihood spend many years in prison for contributing to an organization 
whose designation the D.C. Circuit has held does not even meet the requirements of due process. 
8ecause I believe that the prosecution in this case runs contrary to two of our defining traditions-that 
of free and open expression, and that of justice and fair play-I respectfully dissent from the court's 
failure to correct the panel's errors by taking this case en banc."). 
177 See NeRI, 251 F.3d at 206. 
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challenges made to the designation process since that time, the court has 
continued to apply its holding, and it has never been reviewed by another 
court.178 Review is long overdue. While notice and hearing 
requirements are vitally important, they mean very little if the court does 
not give the organization the right to be heard in front of an impartial and 
detached decisionmaker. 179 The court in NCR] did not fully address the 
far-reaching effects of the FTO designation or the extent of the Mathews 
factors involved. 
D. THE SECRETARY IS NOT A FAIR AND UNBIASED 
DECISIONMAKER 
Assuming that the Secretary is complying with the requirements of 
NCR] and providing organizations pre-designation notice and an 
opportunity to present an opposition to the designation, § 1189 is still 
unconstitutional because it deprives potentially designated organizations 
their constitutional right to a fair and unbiased adjudicator. 18o Without 
this basic due process requirement, the opportunity to be heard is 
virtually meaningless. 
An unbiased adjudicatorl81 is a basic requirement of due process. 182 
This requirement topped the list of Justice Friendly's basic elements of 
procedural due process. 183 The United States Supreme Court has held 
178 See, e.g., People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Chai v. Dep't of State, 466 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
179 In fact the court held that the organization must be given the opportunity "to be 
meaningfully heard by the Secretary upon the relevant findings." NCRI, 251 F.3d at 209. As will be 
discussed at length below, because the Secretary makes the designations, she should not be the 
individual to adjudicate the opposition to the designation. 
180 At least one commentator has suggested that no such notice-and-hearing requirement is 
being offered unless specifically ordered by the court for a particular group. Randolph N. Jonakai, A 
Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated 
Foreign Te"orist Organizations, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125, 147-48 (2003/04). In Chai, the 
Secretary did give some the organization notice of a pending designation. Chai v. Dep't of State, 
466 F.3d 125, 127 (2006). However, the notice only offered to provide the administrative record 
upon request. Id. Although the organizations there did respond, requesting the unclassified portions 
of the record, the Secretary did not so provide because the "did not indicate it was written on behalf 
of a representative ... [the organization]." !d. at 128, 132. The court did not address whether this 
complied with the NCR! holding because "the alleged errors were ... clearly rendered harmless." 
Id. at 132. 
181 Adjudication is a determination of individual rights or duties. UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
ACT 14 (1947). Here, the Secretary's FTO designations are adjudications because she is 
determining the right of the organization to use and have access to its personal property. 
182 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process. "). 
183 Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279 (1975) (listing 
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that the basic requirement of a fair trial in a fair tribunal "applies to 
administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to COurtS.,,184 While 
there are certainly different notions of what it means to be unbiased, the 
Supreme Court has recognized some basic tenets. First, an adjudicator 
may not have a financial or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the 
case. 185 Second, an adjudicator may be disqualified if one of the parties 
has personally criticized or abused the adjudicator. 186 Generally "the 
combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without 
more, constitute a due process violation.,,187 However, there are certain 
additional factors that will make a person's ability to be partial 
questionable. 188 Therefore, courts have found that when a judge makes a 
public statement about the case indicating bias, the judge must recuse 
him or herself. 189 Similarly, "when review of an initial decision is 
mandated, the decisionmaker must be other than the one who made the 
decision under review.,,190 It is also a violation of due process when a 
decisionmaker is asked to evaluate or review his or her own decision. 191 
When one individual rather than one commission or agency acts as both 
investigator or prosecutor and decisionmaker, this may also indicate an 
impermissible bias in adjudication. l92 
eleven basic elements of a fair hearing in order of priority and listing "an unbiased tribunal" first). 
184 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,46 (1975). 
185 Id. (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973»; Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 
409 U.S. 57 (l972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (l927); cf Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. 
Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); see also Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(articulating a test for determining the extent of the pecuniary interest which will disqualify a 
judge.). 
186 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (l975) (citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-03 
(1974}); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (l971); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 
563,578-79 n. 2 (1968); cf Ungarv. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (I 964}. 
187 Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58. 
188 Id. ("[I]f the initial view of the facts ... as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and 
effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a substantial 
due process question would be raised."). 
189 See, e.g., 1616 Second Ave. Rest., Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 75 N.Y. 2d 158 (N.Y. 
1990) (holding that when a State Liquor Commissioner appointed to hear a case regarding an alleged 
violation of state liquor laws by a Manhattan restaurant made comments about the case when called 
to testify before the state senate, he should have recused himself from the three-member 
commission). 
190 Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58 n.25; see also Brown v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, No. 93A-
1-017, 1994 WL 315304, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1994) (finding violation of due process 
when the State Board of Examiners for dental licensing both graded applicant's dental exam and 
heard his petition for review of that decision). 
191 Brown v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, No. 93A-I-017, 1994 WL 315304 (Del. Super. 
Ct. May 23, 1994); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972). 
192 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th CiT. 1991) (finding a "fatal 
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In Morrissey v. Brewer, for example, the Supreme Court held, in a 
case involving an administrative decision by the Iowa Board of Parole to 
revoke parole, that "due process requires that ... the determination that 
reasonable ground exists for revocation of parole should be made by 
someone not directly involved in the case.,,193 The statute at issue in 
Morrissey provided for a two-step process. First, there was an initial 
arrest after a suspected parole violation. 194 This often occurred after a 
recommendation from the parolee's parole officer. At the second stage, 
the parole board would make a final determination as to whether the 
parole would be revoked. 195 The Court found that due process required a 
prompt "preliminary hearing" adjudicated by someone detached and 
uninvolved in the case.196 The Court explained that while it may be 
unfair to assume that the parole officer "bears hostility against the 
parolee that destroys his neutrality," an "officer directly involved in 
making recommendations cannot always have complete objectivity in 
evaluating them.,,197 
Similarly, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that due 
process required a preliminary evidentiary hearing before a welfare 
recipient's welfare could be terminated. 198 In Goldberg, the New York 
City Department of Social Services promulgated a policy whereby a 
caseworker, after questioning a welfare recipient's eligibility, made a 
recommendation to the supervisor whether the recipient's aid should be 
terminated. 199 The recipient could object with written evidence, but if 
that submission was rejected the welfare was immediately terminated.20o 
defect" in "allowing the same person to serve both as decisionmaker and as advocate for the party 
that benefited from the decision.") (citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 190-91, 197 n.ll 
(1982) (finding no due process violation where Medicare permitted insurance carrier employees to 
serve as hearing examiners, but noting with approval that under the Secretary's rules, "'[t]he 
individual selected to act in the capacity of [hearing officer] must not have been involved in any way 
with the determination in question and neither have advised nor given consultation on any request 
for payment which is a basis for the hearing. "') (quoting Secretary's instruction manual). In the 
criminal setting, the Court also found it unconstitutional when the same judge that, through a "judge-
grand jury" system whereby one judge would conduct the entire grand jury hearing in private, also 
tried the case in open court noting that "it is difficult if not impossible for a judge to free himself 
from the influence of what took place in his 'grand-jury' secret session. His recollection of that is 
likely to weigh far more heavily with him than any testimony given in the open hearings." In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 138 (1955). 




197 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. 
198 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). 
199 Id. at 259. 
200 Id. at 260. 
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Only after this process was complete was the recipient entitled to a "fair 
hearing" in front an "independent state hearing officer" where he or she 
could appear personally to present evidence.201 Primarily because of the 
large personal interest at stake-the individual's source of income-the 
Court rejected the idea that because there was a fair hearing after the 
tennination of the benefits, the preliminary hearing did not have to offer 
an opportunity to present evidence in person.202 In so holding, the Court 
required that the preliminary hearing be conducted by someone who did 
not "participate[] in making the determination under review.,,203 In sum, 
in both Goldberg and Morrissey, the Court found that it is violation of 
due process when the person who originally made the decision to deprive 
a person of "life liberty or property" also presides over the proceedings 
to review the accuracy of those decisions. 
Section 1189 suffers from the same shortcoming. Under § 1189, the 
Secretary makes both the initial decision to designate FTOs and the 
subsequent decision when those designations are on review.204 In NCR], 
the court held that the Due Process Clause requires that once this initial 
detennination is made, the organization must be afforded notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the designation takes effect.20s Under 
Goldberg and Morrissey, due process does not allow the Secretary to 
also hear the organization's opposition to the designation. Neither the 
statute nor the court in NCR] requires that these "hearings" be heard by 
anyone else. '" [D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances.' [] (D)ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands. ",206 Neither is it so 
elastic that its protections become, in effect, merely theoretical. The 
Mathews test is designed to find the balance between these extremes. 
201 1d. at 259. 
202 !d. at 261 ("While post-termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact 
which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or assets. Suffice it 
to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of 'brutal need' without a prior hearing of some 
sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justiiY it.") (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 
294 F. Supp. 893, 899-900 (1968». 
203 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
204 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2009). 
20S Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State (NCR!), 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir 
2001). 
206 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citation omitted). 
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IV. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES AN UNBIASED AND DETACHED 
ADJUDICATOR TO REVIEW FTO DESIGNATIONS UNDER § 
1 1 89-THE MATHEWS ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Part II, supra, the Supreme Court held in Mathews 
that "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors:" I) the private interests 
affected by the official action, 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation, and 3) 
the government's interests in omitting the procedural safeguard.207 The 
Mathews test is used to determine both what particular procedural 
safeguards due process requires and when due process is required.208 
Application of the Mathews test will show, first, that the interests 
involved in FTO designations tip the scales in favor of requiring an 
unbiased tribunal, and second, that this should be implemented at an 
initial pre-deprivation hearing. 
A. UNDER MATHEWS, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES AN UNBIASED 
ADmDICATOR TO REVIEW FTO DESIGNATIONS 
The "what" of due process uses the Mathews factors to determine 
"what procedural devices must the ... [parties] have access [to] in order 
to protect their interests against the deprivations worked by the 
statute.,,209 In NCRI, the court weighed these factors and required notice 
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the FTO designation.2IO 
However, perhaps because the court did not fully account for the private 
interests involved in FTO designations, it did not remedy the due process 
violations in § 1189, because it did not require an unbiased 
decisionmaker at the organization's "opportunity to be heard.,,211 A full 
Mathews analysis indicates that the government's interests are 
outweighed by the very significant "private" interests implicated by the 
designation process, as well as the high risk of an erroneous deprivation 
when the Secretary is given the responsibility for reviewing her own 
FTO designations. 
207 Id. at 335. 
208 NCRl, 251 F.3d at 205 ("When analyzing the petitioners' claims, and the government's 
and the government's defenses, we are mindful that two distinct questions remain for us to 
determine ... what due process and when."). 
209 Id. 
210 NCRl, 251 F.3d at 208-09. 
211 See generally NCRl, 251 F.3d 192. 
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1. Private Interests 
The first factor considered under Mathews is the private interest that 
will be affected by the state action.212 This factor considers the degree of 
the potential deprivation as well as the possible length of the 
deprivation.213 In the context of FTO designations both of these 
considerations are extremely important. 
a. Degree of the Potential Deprivation 
In NCRI, the only private factor considered by the court was the 
financial assets of the organization.214 As explained in section III, supra, 
the court erroneously declined to reach the question of whether the 
organization could assert the two other private factors implicated by the 
designation: the organization's right to have its members enter the United 
States, and the organization's members' right of freedom of 
association.215 These two interests also did not factor into the court's 
reasoning when examining the questions of what or when due process 
was due.216 Because the Mathews analysis requires a balancing of 
competing interests, it is necessary to consider all of the interests 
implicated under the designation.217 Therefore, a proper Mathews 
analysis of the private interests must take into account not only the 
organization's property interests but also the First Amendment rights of 
its members. 218 
Although it will be a 
organizations are likely to have 
fact-specific determination, many 
a substantial property interest seized 
212 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (\976). 
213 !d. at 334. 
214 NCRI, 251 F.3d at 206. 
215 Id. at 204-05. The organization raised these interests as additional property interests of 
which they were deprived under § 1189. 
216 NCRI, 251 F.3d at 205-09. 
217 Id. at 206; see also Eric Boxmeyer, The Problems 0/ Security and Freedom: Procedural 
Due Process and The Designation o/Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 439, 466 (2004) (court seemed to be 
confusing the question of whether a property interest implicates the Due Process clause with the 
issue of what weight to allocate it). 
218 It is much less clear whether the organization could assert the rights of its members to 
enter the country. Although an alien's interest in not being "removed from his community, his 
home, and his family" is "accorded the utmost weight," Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 
(D.NJ. 1999), it is unlikely that the organization would have standing to assert it because there is no 
definite "injury in fact." Unlike the inability of the organization to raise funds, the deportation or 
inadmissibility of its members is not automatic but rather depends on factors listed in § 1182. For 
that reason, this Comment will only consider the First Amendment rights of the organizations 
members in conducting the Mathews analysis. 
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upon by a § 1189 designation. The statute provides that upon 
designation, U.S. financial institutions must block all financial 
transactions involving the organization's "assets.,,219 Because the 
Department of Treasury defines "assets" in the Code of Federal 
Regulations very broadly,220 an organization with presence in the United 
States is also likely to have a very substantial amount of property 
seized.221 Additionally, the courts have yet to address the issue in the 
context of FTO designations. The organization probably has a 
recognized property interest in its diminished ability to raise financial 
support due to the "material support" ban.222 Depending on the 
organization, this interest may be very substantial. 223 As a result, the 
organization will likely have very significant property interests at stake 
in § 1189 designations. 
Additionally, as discussed above, § 2339B prohibits the act of 
providing "material support" to a designated terrorist organization,224 
including the provision of "currency or monetary instruments.,,225 The 
Supreme Court has held that making monetary contributions to an 
organization is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment.226 
Therefore, whether an organization is a designated FTO affects its 
219 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(2)(C) (2009). 
220 "Assets" for the purposes of 1189 includes a long list of property including "money, 
checks, ... bank deposits, savings accounts, debts, ... stocks, bonds, ... mortgages, pledges, liens 
or other rights in the nature of security, ... bills of sale, any other evidences of title, ownership or 
indebtedness, letters of credit and any documents relating to any rights or obligations thereunder, 
powers of attorney, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, ... land contracts, leaseholds, ground 
rents, real estate ... royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, judgments, patents, trademarks or 
copyrights, insurance policies, safe deposit boxes and their contents, . . . services of any nature 
whatsoever, contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property, real, personal, or mixed, 
tangible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future or contingent." 31 C.F .R. § 
597.302 (2009). 
221 In 2005 the Office of Foreign Assets Control for the U.S. Department estimated that the 
United States had blocked around 13 million dollars in assets between the SGOT, SOT, and FTO 
designation programs. This despite the policy not to conduct valuations of tangible or real property. 
OFFICE OF THE FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. OEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TERRORIST ASSETS 
REpORT 11-12 (2005), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2005.pdf. 
222 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) ("Property is more than the mere thing which 
a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The 
Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Property consists of the free use, 
enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of 
the land. ") (citation omitted). 
223 For example, the contributions made to the Global Relief Fund, a non-profit charitable 
group and a designated SOGT totaled around three million dollars in 2000. Global Relief Found., 
Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
224 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(I) (2009). 
225/d. at § 2339B(g)(4) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(I)) (2009). 
226 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 16 (1976). 
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contributors' First Amendment rights because contributors can no longer 
exercise their free speech rights by donating money to the 
organization.227 Moreover, once an individual is charged under § 2339B 
the conviction may not be challenged on First Amendment grounds. The 
appellate courts228 have consistently held that the restriction is not 
designed to limit speech but rather to restrict the conduct of providing 
material support to a terrorist organization.229 As the Ninth Circuit 
recognized, there is "no constitutional right to facilitate terrorism by 
giving terrorists ... resources with which [they] can buy weapons and 
explosives.'.230 Therefore, determination of whether an organization is 
an FTO is "crucial, because it distinguishes activities that can be 
criminalized from those that are protected by the First Amendment.,,231 
If the designation affects the rights of the organization's members 
under the First Amendment, the next question is whether it is proper for 
those interests to be recognized in a Mathews analysis-not as a part of 
the individual's due process rights but of the organization's rights. 
There are several reasons why the interests of the individuals charged 
under § 2339B ought to be considered under the "private interests" prong 
of the organization. First, the individuals themselves are statutorily 
barred from collaterally attacking the validity of the organization's 
designation to defend against 2339B prosecution.232 Section 1189 
explicitly provides that no person charged with providing "material 
support" may contest the validity of the designation of the FTO.233 
Second, the courts have consistently declined to recognize the right of 
227 U.S. v. Afshari, 446 F.3d. 915,917 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("It is firmly 
established that monetary contributions to political organizations are a form of 'speech' protected by 
the First Amendment ... [we have held that] giving money to a designated terrorist organization is 
not protected speech. But if the organization is not a designated terrorist organization, then monetary 
contributions to it are protected by the First Amendment. "). 
228 The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); Rahmani v. U.S., 127 S. Ct. 930 (2007). 
229 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Hammoud, 
381 FJd 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005); U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 
541,569 (E.D. Va. 2002); U.S. v. Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2006). But see U.S. v. 
AI-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304-05 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (reading a specific intent requirement 
into the statute in order to avoid perceived 1st Amendment infringement). 
230 Humanitarian Law Project, 205 FJd at 1133. 
231 U.S. v. Afshari, 446 F.3d. 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
232 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(8); see also U.S. v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1071-72 (N.D. 
Ill. 2005); U.S. v. Hammoud, 381 FJd 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). 
233 8 U .S.c. § 1 189(a)(8) ("If a designation under this subsection has become effective ... a 
defendant in a criminal action or an alien in a removal proceeding shall not be permitted to raise any 
question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation as a defense or an objection at 
any trial or hearing."). 
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individuals to collaterally challenge the validity of the designation?34 
Consequently, the organization is the only party that is capable of 
asserting these constitutional interests. Because the individuals, whose 
rights are drastically affected by this designation, have no right to 
collaterally challenge the accuracy of the designation, the interests of 
these individuals should be considered when conducting a Mathews 
analysis. 
A third reason why these interests should be considered in the 
Mathews analysis is that an organization is entitled to assert the 
constitutional rights of its members when there is a sufficient "nexus" 
between the organization's rights and the rights of the members, such 
that they are essentially the same.235 As a general rule, parties may rely 
only "on constitutional rights which are personal to themselves.,,236 This 
requires that (1) the party suffered some injury in fact, and (2) he is only 
asserting rights granted to him in a relevant constitutional or statutory 
provision.237 However, courts generally waive the second requirement 
and allow an organization to assert the rights of its members if there is a 
sufficient "nexus" between the in-court representative and the person 
whose constitutional rights are being deprived.238 The courts are 
especially likely to allow the organization to assert its members' rights 
when it is impossible or unlikely that the individual will be able to assert 
his or her own rights,239 when the in-court representative and the 
individual's rights "are in every practical sense identical,,,240 or when 
"the Government has lumped all the members' interests in the 
organization so that condemnation of the one will reach all.,,241 
For organizations potentially designated as FTOs, the diminished 
ability of the organization to collect funds and support from individuals 
234 See e.g., U.S. v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, \071-72 (N.D.Ill. 2005) (finding that the 
fact that the organization was designated was the underlying element of the charge, not the validity). 
In u.s. v. Afthari, 426 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005), the court even upheld a conviction based on the 
very designation that was found to be an unconstitutional deprivation of due process in NCR] 
because under United States Supreme Court precedent, an unconstitutional predicate charge did not 
necessarily invalidate the contingent or subsequent charge. Afthari, 426 F.3d at 1158 (citing Lewis 
v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55,100 (\980». 
235 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (\ 958). 
236 [d. at 459. 
237 Scodari v. Alexander, 69 F.R.D. 652, 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
238 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458 (1958). 
239 See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (\ 953) (allowing a person sued for failure 
to enforce a racially restrictive covenant to assert the Equal Protection rights of the non-Caucasians 
who were not before the court). 
240 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). 
241 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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will likely satisfy the first requirement. 242 As for the second, a court is 
likely to find a "nexus" sufficient to give the organization standing to 
assert its members' First Amendment rights. First, it is not only more 
difficult for the members to assert their own First Amendment rights-it 
is impossible. Second, by making it impossible for individuals to 
challenge the validity of the organization's FTO designation, Congress 
has completely intertwined the rights of the individuals and the rights of 
the organization. There is no greater example of where Congress has 
"lumped" the organization's and members' rights together such that the 
"condemnation of the one will reach all. ,,243 
Because the organization could bring a separate suit to vindicate its 
members' freedom of speech rights, and because the individual has no 
opportunity to contest the validity of the FTO designation once she is 
charged under § 2339B, these interests should be considered under the 
"private interests" prong of the Mathews analysis.244 When this 
constitutional right is considered along with the seizure of all of the 
organization's property within the United States, the "private interests" 
affected by the designation are substantial. 
b. Length of the Potential Deprivation 
Originally, the FTO designation lasted for only two years.245 Now 
the designation is effectively permanent. As amended in 2004, § 1189 
provides that a designation will remain in effect until revoked by the 
Secretary.246 Moreover, while an organization is entitled to petition for 
review of the designation, it may not do so until two years after the 
designation247 or two years after the outcome of the last petition.248 If the 
organization does not petition for review of the designation, the 
Secretary will not review it until five years after the designation.249 
242 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,459-60 (1958) (noting that the compelled disclosure of 
an NAACP's membership lists which will likely affect the ability of the organization to obtain 
financial support "is a further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner has standing to 
complain of the production order on behalf of its members."). 
243 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comrn. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, 1., 
concurring). 
244 See Eric Broxmeyer, The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process 
and the Designation of Foreign Te"orist Organizations under the Anti-Te"orism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 439, 462 n.193 (2004). 
245 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000). 
246 8 U.·S.C. § 1 I 89(a)(4)(A) (2009). 
247/d. at § I 1 89(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I)(2009). 
248 1d. at § I I 89(a)(4)(B)(ii)(II) (2009). 
249 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(4)(C)(i) (2009). 
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Therefore, once an organization is designated there is nothing the 
organization can do for two years. During this time, its members cannot 
provide support without facing fifteen years in prison.250 In the case of 
non-citizens, the members may face removal and deportation.251 
The court in NCRI did not fully consider the extent of the 
organization's property interest affected by the § 1189 designation or the 
First Amendment interests of its members.252 Additionally, after the 
ruling in NCRI, § 1189 was amended to make designations last 
indefinitely. Therefore, both the degree of the private interests affected 
by this designation and the length of the deprivation weigh in favor of 
more procedural safeguards than were required in NCRI. 
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
The second factor in the Mathews analysis is the "risk of an 
erroneous deprivation" of the interests through the procedures used and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards.253 Here, a court considers several factors: the risk inherent in 
the truth finding process; the degree to which the person is given access 
to the information relied upon by the [government] agency in making the 
determination and to respond to the arguments made by the agency; and 
the existence of an appellate procedure after the determination, as well as 
the rate of success of those appeals.254 
Each of these factors also weighs in favor of requiring an unbiased 
tribunal to review FTO designations. First, there are inherent risks to the 
truth-finding process in § 1189 designations because there is no 
limitation on the type of evidence that may be used in making this 
determination.255 The record is often full of hearsay and second-hand 
accounts and information contained on the Internet.256 Indeed, the record 
may be filled with anything, regardless of its accuracy or reliability.257 
While the Supreme Court has often held that agencies are not required to 
follow the strict evidence rules used in criminal and civil trials,258 
250 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009). 
251 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2009). 
252 See generally Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State (NCRl), 251 F.3d 192 
(D.C. Cir 2001). 
253 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
254 Id. at 344-47. 
255 People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State ("PMOf'), 182 F.3d 17, 18-19 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
256SeePMOI, 182F.3d 17. 
257 See id. at 25. 
258 See, e.g., Opp Cotton MiIls V. Adm'r of Wage & Hour Div. of Dep't of Labor, 312 U.S. 
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administrative decisions are not immune from standards of evidence.259 
Such guidelines should provide guidance in evaluating the reliability of 
the evidence compiled in the Secretary's administrative record. Yet, 
without a detached decisionmaker, the same person who introduced the 
evidence-the Secretary-is also asked to consider its persuasiveness 
during the hearing. Second, the organization often is not given access to 
the information relied upon because an FTO designation may rely 
entirely on classified materia1.260 An independent party could review the 
classified information and compare it to the evidence offered by the 
organization. Due to the complete absence of evidentiary standards in 
FTO designation, as well as the ability to base the entire designation on 
classified information, without an impartial adjudicator to weigh and 
evaluate the competing evidence, there is a very substantial risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of the private interests involved.261 
126, 155 (I941) ("[I]t has long been settled that the technical rules for the exclusion of evidence 
applicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings before federal administrative agencies in the 
absence of a statutory requirement that such rules are to be observed."). 
259 The AP A, for instance, requires that agency hearings exclude "irrelevant, immaterial, or 
unduly repetitious evidence" and must be "supported by and in accordance with the reliable, 
probative, and substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2009). AdditionaIly, the Supreme Court has 
been wary of upholding decisions based on hearsay; in fact, the Court used to require that 
administrative rulings be set aside unless supported by at least some evidence that could be 
admissible in a jury trial. See Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 435 (N.Y. 1916). 
This was known as the "residuum rule." Johnson v. U.S., 628 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Gradually 
the Court retreated from this per se rule but still remained hesitant to rely on hearsay evidence for 
findings of fact. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (I938), the Court held that 
"[m]ere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence." Consolidated 
Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 230. Then, in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (I971), the Court 
qualified the holding in Consolidated by noting that "the contrast the ... [Court] was drawing ... 
was not with material that would be deemed formally inadmissible in judicial proceedings but with 
material 'without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.' This was not a blanket 
rejection by the Court of administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and probative 
value. The opposite was the case." Richardson, 402 U.S. at 407. Now there is no per se rule and the 
courts "evaluate the weight each item of hearsay should receive according to the item's truthfulness, 
reasonableness, and credibility." Johnson v. United States, 628 F.2d 187, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
260 8 U.S.c. § I I 89(a)(3)(B) (2009). 
261 Also, there is tremendous pressure to designate as many organizations as FTO's as 
possible, because the only way to prevent "material support" to these organizations is to pre-
designate them. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(I). Without a detached and unbiased adjudicator, this 
provision could be "applied in a selective and politicaIly biased manner." On the Constitutionality of 
Counterterrorism Legislation: Hearing on S. 390 and S. 735 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Government, 104th Congo (1995) (statement of David 
Cole, Professor Georgetown University Law Center), available at 1995 WL 261360 (F.D.C.H.) ("by 
providing such open-ended designation authority, the Congress has essentially invited this law to be 
applied in a selective and politically biased manner. As President George Bush once stated, 'one 
man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.' Our history has demonstrated that groups engaged 
in the same violent acts are designated 'terrorist' when the Administration disagrees with their 
political ends, and deemed 'freedom fighters' when the Administration supports their political ends. 
Thus, the Nicaraguan contras and the Afghanistan Mujahedin were never designated as 'terrorist' 
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3. Government Interests/Cost of Providing the Procedural Safeguard 
The third and final factor that must be considered under the 
Mathews balancing test is the government/public interests. This includes 
the "administrative burden and other societal costs" that would be 
incurred in using a neutral decisionmaker. 262 Requiring a neutral and 
detached decisionmaker in FTO designations would impose little to no 
fiscal burden. Due process does not require "the neutral and detached 
trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer.,,263 
Thus, any officer or agent within the Department of State could act as the 
neutral decisionmaker in these determinations. An increase in the 
amount, length, or cost of an administrative hearing will sometimes 
justify denying the procedural protection.264 However, there is no 
indication that any of these considerations would be present if the court 
required the Secretary to appoint a qualified, yet detached State 
Department employee to hear the contested designations. 
The most significant government interest that may be implicated in 
FTO designations is the government's interest in national security. 
However, requiring a detached magistrate to review the FTO designation 
would not implicate the government's interest in national security. In 
NCRI, the court acknowledged that "no governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the nation," yet it could not see how 
requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard implicated that 
interest.265 Similarly, while the government still has an extremely 
important interest in the security of this nation, providing a fair and 
unbiased adjudicator does not implicate that concern. Again, agents of 
the Department of State who already have access to classified 
information, but who are detached from FTO designations, could fill this 
role. Additionally, the statute itself provides for ex parte judicial review 
of the information relied upon?66 A neutral decisionmaker could 
similarly conduct an ex parte review without implicating national 
groups by the State Department, while the African National Congress, the FMLN in EI Salvador, and 
the Irish Republican Anny were so designated, notwithstanding that all of these groups engaged in 
conduct that would qualify as 'terrorism. "'). 
262 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976). 
263 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584,607 (1979). 
264 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) (requiring a pre-deprivation 
hearing prior to depriving disability beneficiaries of disability checks was too burdensome in part 
because of the "increased number of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible 
recipients pending decision."). 
265 Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State (NeRI), 251 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. Cir 
2001). 
266 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2) (2009). 
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security concerns. 
B. THE MATHEWS FACTORS TIP THE SCALES IN FA VOR OF AN 
UNBIASED TRIBUNAL TO PRESIDE OVER DESIGNATION 
HEARINGS 
The private interests implicated by § 1189 are substantial. While 
the amount of the property interest seized may vary depending on the 
organization, the First Amendment rights are almost always at stake. 
Without a neutral decisionmaker, the risk that these interests may be 
denied wrongly or unjustly is unreasonably high. While the government 
has an overwhelmingly strong interest in ensuring that the United States 
remains safe and secure, this interest would not be implicated by a 
requirement that an organization be provided an unbiased tribunal for its 
NCRI-mandated hearing. Given these considerations, the Mathews 
analysis requires that basic due process be afforded in all FTO 
designations of organizations with presence within the United States. If 
due process is required, the only remaining question is when due process 
should be required. 
C. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL PRIOR 
TO THE FTO DESIGNATION 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an impartial decisionmaker 
may not always be required during a pre-deprivation hearing.267 
However, this is only when there is a mandated full administrative 
review post-deprivation.268 A full administrative review includes a long 
list of procedural safeguards, including notice, an oral evidentiary 
hearing, standards for proof, burdens of proof, and cross-examination, 
among other things.269 Section 1189 does not provide a full 
administrative review post-designation.270 Indeed, at no time does § 
1189 provide for a full administrative review. Although § 1189 does 
allow an organization to petition for revocation two years later, this is 
insufficient to justify denying an unbiased adjudicator in the pre-
designation hearings, because this is not a review of the original 
designation.271 The petition procedure does not contemplate review of 
267 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LoudenniJl, 470 U.S. 532, 547-548 (1988). 
268Id.545. 
269 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 554 et seq (2009). 
270 See generally 8 U.S.c. § 1189 (2009). 
271 8 U.S.C. § I I 89(a)(6)(A)(i) (2009) ("[T]he circumstances that were the basis for the 
designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation .... "). 
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the accuracy of the original determination; instead, it assumes the 
original designation was proper and is an opportunity to show changed 
circumstances. 
In NCRI, the court found that in most cases there was no reason to 
delay a hearing until after the deprivation has already taken place.272 As 
previously discussed, the court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of a 
"private interest" of two hundred dollars and despite the fact that the 
designation was temporary, lasting only two years.273 Section 1189 is, 
for all intents and purposes, now permanent, and the full scope of the 
"private interests" affected by the designation is now evident. Given the 
severe consequences of this designation and the insubstantial burden the 
procedural safeguard would impose on the designation process, an 
impartial adjudicator should preside over the organization's opportunity 
to be heard prior to the FTO designation.274 
V. CONCLUSION 
Due process is "compounded of history, reason, the past course of 
decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith 
which we profess.,,275 While the United States Government has 
courageously taken a stance against terrorist organizations, we must 
ensure that in so doing we do not sweep too broadly and destroy the very 
freedoms that we are fighting to protect. One of the most powerful tools 
for ensuring truth, accuracy and justice is the procedural due process 
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Its protections 
must not be forgotten or diminished, especially in times of turmoil.276 
The Mathews test was designed to facilitate a balance between the 
legitimate needs of the government and the freedom of individuals, and 
these considerations expand and contract in direct proportion to the 
gravity of the times and the seriousness of the infraction. Though these 
are certainly extraordinary times, the basic protections of the due process 
clause must be respected. This Comment will close as it began, with the 
wise words of Justice Frankfurter: "Man being what he is cannot safely 
be trusted with complete immunity from outward responsibility in 
272 Nat'l Council of Resistance ofIran v. Dep't of State (NCR!), 251 F.3d 192,208 (D.C. Cir 
2001). 
273 NCRI, 251 F.3d 192. 
274 Of course, should the Secretary demonstrate "the necessity of withholding" notice and 
opportunity to be heard until after the designation, as forecasted by NCRI, the requirement of a 
neutral decisionmaker should be implemented at that later time as well. 
275 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
276 [d. at 171-72. 
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depriving others of their rights.,,277 
MICAH WYAIT· 
277 Jd. at 17 \. 
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